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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLEN FROYD and M. F. 
BURGESS, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
a body corporate and politic; L. ) 
V. Broadbent, as Mayor, and J. L. I' 
Fakler, Frank Milne, Marion F. 
Grames, Gail S. Seegmiller and 
Haldow E. Christensen, as Coun-
cilmen of said City, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 7564 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of the case as given by the appellants 
is correct and the respondents, who are Cedar City Corp-
oration and its Mayor and City Council will be referred 
to as the "City", the Southwest Utah Power Federation, 
as the "Federation", the Southern Utah Power Company 
as the "Power Company" and the Rural Electrification 
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2 
Administration,· as the "R. E. A." in order that these 
abreviations will be used in the same sense as the appel-
lants. 
The respondents agree with the statement of facts as 
set out by the appellants with one additional fact which 
should be made clear to the Court. The capital stock of 
the power company is owned by Washington Gas and 
Electric Company, a utility corporation now in bandrupt-
cy in the Federal Court in and for the Southern District 
of New York. Cedar City and the Federation have agreed 
to purchase from the Court appointed Trustee for this 
company, the common stock of the power company and 
as to whether this can be consummated, along with other 
related questions, are the questions to be decided by thif.J 
Court. 
In order to directly meet and answer the argument 
presented by the appellants, the four points relied upon 
by them will be discussed in this brief in the same order 
except that it is felt that points ·number 1 and 4 of the 
appellants' brief involve related legal principles and they 
will therefore be joined for the purpose of argument. Fol-
lowing are set forth the points relied upon by the re-
spondents: 
1. The City, in agreeing to purchase a portion of 
the common stock of the power cbmpany for the 
purpose of participating in the dissolution and ac-
quisition of its assets and becoming a member of the 
Federation has not violated the Constitution for the 
reason that the City is doing nothing in aid of an-
other corporation or individual and for the further 
reason that ·no public funds or credit is involved. 
2. Cedar City has statutory authority to estab-
lish a municipal power system and the method 
chosen is legal and in the exercise of the legislative 
discretion of the City. 
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3 
3. The City has not delegated to anyone its rate 
making power or power to determine the type and 
cost of a municipal power system. 
4. The plaintiffs can in no way be adversely 
affected by the consummation of the proposed plan 
and therefore have no cause to complain. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
CEDAR CITY, IN AGREEING TO PURCHASE A POR-
TION OF THE COMMON STOCK OF THE POWER 
COMPANY FOR THE PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING 
IN THE DISSOLUTION AND ACQUISITION OF ITS 
ASSETS AND BECOMING A MEMBER OF THE FED-
ERATION HAS NOT VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION 
FOR THE REASON THAT THE CITY IS DOING NOTH-
ING IN AID OF ANOTHER CORPORATION OR INDI-
VIDUAL AND FOR THE FURTHER REASON THAT 
NO PUBLIC FUNDS OR CREDIT IS INVOLVED. 
Specifically, the appellants contend that Article VI 
Section 31 of our Constitution and also Article XIV, 
Sections 3 and 4 will be violated by the consummation of 
the power plan proposed by the City. As pointed out in 
their brief and stateme·nt of facts, the city proposes to 
purchase 11,305 shares of the common stock of the power 
company, or 17.97% of the stock and the Federation 
proposes to purchase the remainder or 51,605 shares and 
amounting to 82.03%. Each of the two purchasers is 
also having to pay the same proportion of the obligations 
of the power company so that the total portion of the 
purchase price to be paid by the city amounts to approx-
imately $337,000. In order to raise this sum, Cedar City 
proposes to issue Electric Revenue Bonds in the amount 
of $375,000.00. In other words, the first step in the pro-
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4 
posed scheme involves the purchase by the city of shares 
of stock in a corporation. 
Article VI, Section 31 of our Constitution would ap-
pear at first reading to prohibit this and which we also 
quote: 
"(LENDING PUBLIC CREDIT FORBIDDEN). 
The Legislature shall not authorize the State, or 
any county, city, town, township, district or other 
political subdivision of the State to lend its credit or 
subscribe to stock or bonds in aid of any railroad} telegraph 
or other private individual or corporate enterprise or un-
dertaking.}} 
It is obvious as the appellants state, this section can 
be divided into two parts, (a) It prohibits any city from 
subscribing stock in aid of any individual, corporate 
enterprise or undertaking and (b) from lending its pub-
lic credit in aid of any such individual, corporation or 
undertaking. The city has no quarrel with the provisions 
of this section and indeed can see its wisdom, but the 
city strenuously contends that it has no application to 
the present case. 
A majority of our states have similar constitutional 
provisions and the reason for them is very clearly stated 
in 152 A.L.R. 495, as follows: 
"Early in the nineteenth century it seems to 
have been the general practice of states to encourage 
the building of railroads by permitting the state or 
subdivisions thereof to purchase stock in railroad 
corporations, to issue bonds or lend credit in aid of 
railroads, or to make outright do·nations to them. 
However, due to the large number of insolvencies of 
railroads, caused by fraud or economic conditions, 
states and subdivisions thereof found themselves 
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5 
largely indebted and were themselves occasionally 
insolvent because of large investments in such inter-
prises. Therefore, a reversal of policy set in". 
It might be added that cities have i'n the past donated 
building sites for corporations and individuals and made 
many other monetary inducements to them. This was 
done by the expenditure of public funds raised primarily 
from taxation. This practice is so manifestly wrong as to 
leave no room to doubt the wisdom of such enactments 
to prohibit it. But the proposed purchase by the city of 
the capital stock of the power company most certainly 
does not come within this prohibition according to the 
general rule of law followed in the states where this 
question has arisen and particularly as held by two decis-
ions of this Court interpreting Article VI, Section 31 of 
our Constitution. 
In the first place, the purchase of this stock is only 
preliminary to the main purpose of the purchase - the 
acquisition of the physical properties of the power com-
pany after its dissolution by the City and the Federation. 
Surely the appellants could have no cause to complain if 
the city were to purchase the distribution system of the 
power company, which even the appellants concede it 
could legally do. But it seems that purchase of capital 
stock for the purpose of enabling the city to participate 
in the dissolution of the power company and the division 
of its assets afterwards is vastly more irregular and in 
fact is downright unconstitutional. It is obvious that the 
plan to purchase the stock is only for the purpose of dis-
solution of the power company because the two purchas-
ers, the City and the Federation had agreed September 
23, 1949 as to the dissolution of the power company and 
the division of its assets between them according to the 
terms of the Dissolution Agreement (Ex. "B" · of Def. 
Ans., Rec. 36-40) but the actual agreements for the pur-
chase of the stock, (Ex. "A" of Def. Ans. Rec. 27-35) was 
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6 
not entered into until February 16, 1950. In other words, 
the City and the Federation had already agreed as to the 
dissolution and the division of the properties approxi-
mately five months before they even agreed to purchase 
the stock. Therefore, it is obvious that the purchase is 
1
i 
only for the purpose of the dissolution of the power ·com- !: 
pany and the acquisition of its assets - the destroying 
of the corporation so its property can be obtained. The 
majority rule in this country is that a purchase of cor-
porate stock for the purpose of dissolution does not come 
within the constitutional provisions similar to our Con-
stitution as above quoted. The following cases so hold: 
Brode v. Philadelphia 230 Pa. 434, 79 A. 659. 
State Ex Rei Johnson v. Consumers Public Power 
Distrist, 10 N.W.2nd, 784. 
People Ex Rei. Murphy v. Kelly, 76 N. Y. 475. 
Cawood v. Coleman 294 Ky. 858, 172 S.W.2nd. 548. 
Long v. Mayo, 271 Ky. 192, 111 S.W.2nd. 633. 
Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 338. 
McGuire v. Cincinnati, 40 NE.2nd. 435. 
Most of the above cases are cited in 152 A.L.R. 512 
where an excellent discussion of the question involved is 
to be ·found. True, the court in the main case of the an-
notation, State Ex Rei. Johnson v. Consumers Public 
Power District, supra, which held that the Nebraska Con-
stitution was not violated, used the language of a pur-
chase of all of the stock of a corporation but it is obvious 
that the language was never inte·nded to mean that un-
less all the stock was purchased, the agreement to pur-
chase only a part was illegal. What the Court did mean 
was that the purchase of only part of the stock of the 
corporation, leaving it operating as a going concern with 
the government agency or subdivision being a stock-
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holder was within the prohibition which is as it should 
be. But if the effect of the purchase is as in this case, 
to immediately and simultaneously dissolve the cor-
poration and render it defunct, it would make no differ-
ence whether the municipality bought only part of the 
stock or all of it. In other words its co-purchaser is 
joining with the dissolution. The net result of the pur-
chase would be the same whether the City purchased 
all of the stock or only part of it. Purchasing only part 
of the stock and leaving the corporation to operate 
could very well be "in aid" of the corporation but to 
purchase all for the purpose of conjointly dissolving it 
could not in the widest stretch of the imagination be 
deemed "in aid" of the corporation but the exact oppo-
site. 
The reason for the rule that purchasing of stock for 
the purpose of dissolution not being within the prohibi-
tion of our constitution is stated in the case of the State 
Ex Rei Johnson v. Consumers Public Power District, 
supra, as follows: 
"Section 1, Article XI of our constitution was never 
intended to prohibit a purchase by a subdivision of 
the state of all the capital stock of a corporation 
solely for the purpose of lawfully acquiring the phy-
sical property of such corporation for a public use, 
constitutionally defined and lawfully authorized by 
the legislature." 
Also the case of People ex. Rel. Murphy v. Kelly, supra, 
where the New York Legislature had passed an act al-
lowing the cities of New York and Brooklyn to jointly 
buy the Brooklyn Bridge by the buying of the stock of 
the corporation owning the bridge, held, 
"It was not the purpose of the act to make the City 
of New York a stockholder in the bridge company or 
to cause it to loan any money or credit to such com-
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pany. It was the purpose of the act to extinguish the 
company and to vest all its property in the two cities 
for a public purpose. All the money they paid for 
stock or upon the debts of the company was simply 
a furtherance of the purpose, to vest the property 
of the bridge in the two cities and it was not to aid 
the company or to make the cities stock holders 
therein. The effect was to be the dissolution of the 
company and transfer of the property of the com-
pany." 
It is submitted that this case is directly in point with 
the case at bar because neither of the purchasers pur-
chased all of the stock but each only a part, but between 
the two of them, all was purchased and for the purpose 
of dividing and acquiring the physical property. 
As pointed out above, the reason the courts hold 
that a purchase of corporate stock by a municipality for 
the purpose of dissolving the corporation and acquiring 
its assets does not violate constitutional prohibitions 
such as our own is because there is no "aid" to the corp-
oration. It is not the bare purchase of the stock that is 
intended to be prevented but the giving of aid to the 
corporation by the expenditure of public funds. 
There is another reason why the proposed purchase 
of this stock does not violate our constitution and which 
is one not found in any of the cases cited by the counsel 
for either the appellants or respondents, which is that 
public funds or credit are not involved in this case. The 
very heading of our constitutional provision above quoted 
"Lending of Public Credit Forbidden" shows clearly that 
it was intended that the funds or mo·ney or credit to be 
protected was· public funds raised from taxation or other 
lawful means. 
In other words, it is to safeguard the public treasury 
and public funds and to prevent the use of such funds 
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for such private purposes. As pointed out in 152 A.L.R. 
512, supra a city could become insolvent or impoverished, 
its credit ruined and deprived of its ability to serve its 
citizens by unwise and costly financial ventures in aid 
of other individuals or corporations. 
But the money to be spent by the City for its portion 
of the power company and consisting of the distribution 
system in Cedar City, and also for future cost of mainten-
ance and operation would not be the type of funds in-
tended by the constitutional restriction. They are not 
public funds in any sense of the word but are special 
funds which in no way affect the tax structure, the 
finance, credit or solvency of the City. A discussion of 
the "special fund" doctrine should not be necessary in 
this case. Needless to say, this court has adopted and 
affirmed the special fund doctrine in a long line of cases. 
See Barnes vs. Lehi City, 278 Pac. 878, Fjeldsted vs. Og-
den City, 28 Pac. 2nd. 144, Utah Power and Light Co. vs. 
Provo City, 74 Pac. 2nd, 1191, Utah Power a·nd Light Co. 
vs. Ogden City, 79 Pac. 2nd. 61. Briefly the doctrine as 
established by the above cited Utah cases and also by a 
majority of the States of our union is that where the 
money for the purchase or construction of an income pro-
ducing utility or property comes from the sale of Reve-
nue bonds, the payment of which and interest thereon, 
together with all cost of operation, come from the gross 
revenue received from the operation of the property or 
utility, the funds involved are not public funds within the 
meaning of our constitution and particularly Article XIV, 
sections 3 and 4 which limit the indebtedness of our 
cities, towns and counties. The right of a city or county 
to issue and sell such bonds does not even have to be 
submitted to an election by the people for the reason 
that a public debt is not being created. Furthermore, the 
cases of Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Ogden City, supra 
and Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Provo City, supra hold 
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that the large expenditure to· construct electric light 
systems does not ·even have to be first noticed for bids 
from contractors because public funds are not being 
spent. Surely Article VI, Section 31 of our Constitution 
in prohibiting the expenditure of funds for stock in cor-
porations or lending credit has reference to public funds 
from the public treasury raised by taxation or some 
other legal method. The Provo City case gives an ex-
haustive treatment of the special fund doctrine and def-
initely shows that the expenditure of special funds has 
nothing to do with taxes, credit or financial structure of 
a city. 
Nothing more will be said regarding the special fund 
doctrine other than to state that so far as known to the 
writer, no case cited by counsel for the appellants which 
may have held that the particular spending or lending 
under consideration was in violation of the constitution-
al provision similar to ours, was a case where only spe-
cial funds were involved. In all the cases cited by counsel, 
the funds were definitely public funds or general credit 
of the political subdivision and coming from taxes or 
some other source of general income and were not in 
the category of special funds as are involved in this case 
and as defined in the Provo City case. 
Therefore, if the funds involved are not the type of 
funds contemplated by our constitutional provisions 
above quoted, then the whole prohibition must fall as 
it has no application. 
In fact it might be pointed out that the expenditure 
of the funds involved could in no way adversely affect 
the city's credit. The only conceivable way it could have 
anything to do with the financial structure of the city 
would be for the better. Of course the success of the pro- 1 . 
posed venture is not assured but surely the City expects ' 1 
to make some profit from such an operation which would II 
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definitely improve the City's financial condition or en-
able the City to lower its tax rate because of the added 
money. 
As above pointed out, Article VI, Section 31 of our 
Constitution prohibits the lending of credit of the City 
as well as purchasing stock in a corporation and appel-
lants claim that the credit of Cedar City is being le·nt to 
the Federation and here we have a slightly different 
proposition, but in any event there is no lending of cre-
dit by the City. In the first place no public credit of the 
City is involved or in any way jeopardized for the reason 
that only special funds are involved and the argument 
above presented regarding the use of such funds for the 
purchase of the capital stock would be applicable to the 
lending of credit. 
True, the Federation has tour other members besides 
the City covering all of the Southern counties of the 
State and to a minor degree in northern Arizona. The 
generating plants and transmission lines of the Federa-
tion will be scattered and Cedar City is only the hub, so 
to speak. Under the proposed plan, Cedar City would own 
its distribution system outright, and the Federation 
would have no claim to or lien upon it in any way. Like-
wise the holders of the Electric Revenue Bonds, whe·n 
they are issued, would have no claim upon the distribu-
tion system. The City, however, would own no generating 
facilities. It has heretofore decided it would be better to 
buy its needs in power from a non-profit co-operative, 
thus escaping the costs and hazards incident to genera-
tion. To do this the City has become a member of the 
Federation and has signed a contract (Ex. "C" of Def. 
Ans. Rec. 44) to purchase all power for a period of 35 
years at a price of cost to produce the power. Since the 
Federation is a non-profit co-operative, it can make no 
profit but exists and operates solely for the benefit of its 
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members. True, the Federation has no money, but does 
have an approved loan from the R.E.A. for $3,750,000.00 
with which to purchase its portion of the system of the 
power company and to make certain improvements and 
extensions to the system. The Federation and only the 
Federation has executed notes and mortgages on this 
loan and at: no place is the city obligated to pay any part 
of it. The only obligatio·n which the City has is to pur-
chase all of its power from the Federation. The money 
received from the City will of course be used by the Fed-
eration to pay its operating expenses and also to pay off 
the R. E. A. loan and interest. Surely because the City 
will be paying money to the Federation for kilowatts of 
power, which money will then in turn be paid to the 
R.E.A. on the loan cannot be termed an obligation of the 
City to pay off the loan. To repeat, the only sums 
which the City would be obligated to pay would be for 
power delivered according to the terms of the wholesale 
power contract, (Ex. "C" of Def. Ans. Rec. 44). If this 
were determinted to be a le·nding of credit. or the assump-
tion of a debt unlawfully, then every contract which a ci-
ty or other governmental subdivision makes involving the 
payme·nt to another for service or materials rendered 
or delivered to the City is likewise illegal because the 
money so paid would be used by the payee to either pay 
off its own obligations or would go to expenses or profit. 
'The assertion that the City might be obligated to pay 
off the entire loan of $3,750,000.00 or perhaps even 
$20,000,000. if the other members of the Federation or 
the Federation itself went defunct, is truly remarkable. 
This would appear to be a case of painting the worst pos-
sible picture, including matters so remote as to be beyond 
the realm of possibility and then passi'ng it off as a true 
likeness of the business transaction. This is impossible 
because the only payme·nt for which the City is obligated 
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is for the power consumed by its citizens and at a price of 
cost to produce. Surely under the wholesale power con-
tract the appellants cannot seriously contend that the 
City would be required to purchase more power than it 
could use, and this always at cost. If this is not enough 
along with the purchase of power from the Federation 
by its other members to pay off the loan from the R.E.A. 
it may not be paid but even then the City could not be 
jeopardized because its power system would be owned 
by it outright and the Federation could have no recourse 
to it. 
It is interesting to note that appellants have cited 
cases decided by many courts throughout the land in 
which the question of lending of public credit was in-
volved and particularly Constitutional or statutory pro-
visions similar to Article VI, Section 31 of our constitu-
tion. These courts have construed and interpreted these 
different provisions, but no reference is made to the 
cases decided by this Court which interpret our own pro-
vision. This section has come before this Court twice 
before, in the case of Bailey vs. Van Dyke, 240 Pac. 454 
and Lehi City vs. Meiling, 48 Pac. (2nd) 530. In both of 
these cases, the court held that the public spending or 
credit involved was not "in aid of" another corporation 
or individual but was for a public purpose and benefit 
and therefore, not within the prohibition. 
In the Bailey case, the County Commissioners of 
Weber County had entered into an agreement with the 
Utah State Agricultural College and the U. S. Department 
of Agriculture whereby Weber County would pay a por-
tion of the salary and expenses of the Weber County Ag-
ricultural Agent who was to be in Weber County in the 
program of the College and the Dept. of Agriculture. It· 
was claimed that this was a lending of public credit. T!\is 
court held, however, that so long as the contract a:·nd 
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payment was for a public benefit and for the benefit of 
the citizens of Weber County, that the Constitution was 
not violated even if such an arrangement may have ben-
efited the other contracting parties. This would appear 
to be a case of a more direct benefit and aid to the other 
parties than the indirect benefit possibly involved in this 
' case. 
<I 
In the Meiling case, where the Metropolitan Water 
District Act of 1935 was attacked, this court held to the 
same public purpose doctrine. Under the act and being 
Chapter 10, Title 100, U.C.A. 1943, a group of small com-
munities could form a water district for the purpose of 
acquiring, developing and constructing water and water 
sources for the joint use and benefit of all, and generally 
doing what one individual city probably could not do 
alone. The powers of the District as given by the act were 
claimed to violate the Constitution on several grounds, 
but in particular Sectio·n 18 of the Act, subdivision (G) 
which allowed the District of which individual cities 
would be the members, "to borrow money and incur in-
debtedness and to issue bonds or other evidence of such 
indebtedness ....... "and also sub-section (K) which 
allowed the District to "join with one or more other cor-
porations, public or private, for the purpose of carrying 
out any of its powers a·nd for that purpose to contract 
with such other corporation or corporations for the pur-
pose of financing such acquisition, construction, opera-
tion and therein obligate itself severally or jointly with 
such other corporation, or corporations; also to secure, 
guarantee or become surety for the payment of any indebted· 
ness, or the performance of any contract or other obligation that 
may be, or shall have been incurred or entered into by any cor-
poration in which the district shall have acquired shares of stock 
by subscription or otherwise ..... " This Court held that 
the Constitutional provision above quoted was not vio-
lated a·nd said: 
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"The purpose for which the broad powers are 
granted the district are for the acquiring, develop-
ing and use of water for public benefit, and particu-
larly for municipal and domestic uses by the inhab-
itants of the cities and towns which may organize a 
separate district or join with the inhabitants of other 
cities and towns in the organization of a single large 
district. The section must be read and construed 
with reference to the purpose of the act." 
Therefore, it would appear that we do not have to 
look beyond the decisions of our own Court to find what 
the Constitutional provision relied upon by appellants 
means, and these cases, along with the other cases above 
cited should prove that Article VI, Section 31 is not 
violated in any way. 
The appellants also contend that Section 3, Article 
IX of the Articles of Incorporation of the Federation 
commits the City to pay future and contingent sums 
and this obligating the City to lend its credit and like-
wise this is without merit. Admittedly, the wording 
of Section 3 is at best unfortunate but it could not 
be interpreted as meaning anything more than the 
fact that the City will be obligated to pay for its 
power purchased at a rate any different than as set 
forth in the wholesale power contract. That contract 
determines what Cedar City will pay and the rate 
for the power, which is always subject to adjustment 
and change in order to reflect the cost only, which 
may vary. When Section 3, Article IX provides that 
the City will pay for power at rates or on a basis 
to be determined from time to time in accordance 
with the bylaws (Articles), subject to contracts heretofore 
or hereafter entered into between the City and Federation 
then it is clear that the contract determines the rate to 
be paid. Furthermore, no other sums are to be paid as 
an obligation by the City other than for power. 
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Probably of least merit of any contentions made by 
the appellants is that covered by point No. 4 wherein it 
is claimed "The obligations assumed by Cedar City are 
unconstitutional, violating Article XIV, Sections 3 and 4 
of our constitution". There it is claimed that the above 
sections which have to do with the creation of public 
debt and limiting indebtedness apply to this case. 
Attention should be called again to the type of fi-
nancing and the funds involved in this case. The money 
which the city intends to use to purchase its portion of 
the power system would come from the Electric Revenue 
Bonds. All of the money which the City expects to pay 
to the holders of these bonds, all costs of operation of 
the utility, including payment for power purchased from 
the Federation, must come from the gross revenues re-
ceived from the operation of the utility. This is provided 
for in Ordinance No. 100 (Ex. "D" of Def. Ans. Rec. 
48-61) and the City could pay no other monies. It would 
be bound by the ordinance which was submitted to the 
electorate of Cedar City under our Initiative procedure 
and approved by a majority of a large vote. This ordi-
na·nce definitely commits the City to pay all expenses of 
purchasing the system and future operation and main-
tenance from the special fund created from the opera-
tion. No general funds or credits are in any way in-
volved in this case~ Sections 3 and 4, Article XIV of our 
constitution quoted and relied upon by the appellants 
clearly have no application to this case. This court has 
held numerous times that the above sections of our 
constitution have no application to such special funds. 
Some of these cases are Barnes V. Lehi City, Utah Power 
and Light Co. v. Ogden City, and Utah Power and Light 
Co. v. Provo City, supra. Therefore, this matter can be 
dismissed as being entirely without merit. 
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II 
CEDAR CITY HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO 
ESTABLISH A MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEM AND 
THE METHOD CHOSEN IS LEGAL AND IN THE 
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION 
OF THE CITY. 
The appellants concede that a city in Utah has sta-
tutory authority to build, purchase and own a municipal 
power system, and Section 15-8-14, U.C.A. 1943 confers 
this right. A great majority of the cities in Utah have 
elected to have their own municipal power system. The 
generating plants for some of the municipal systems are 
of necessity outside the city limits and of course the ap-
pellants do not argue that a city may not go outside its 
corporate limits for the purpose of ge·nerating power and 
transmitting it to the city. Furthermore, it is also prob-
ably a matter of common knowledge that some of our 
municipalities do not generate all or any part of their 
power but they purchase it from some generating com-
pany at a wholesale rate and then distribute and sell it 
retail to its citizens. As to which method is chosen is a 
matter for the legislative discretion of each individual 
city. Cedar City has determined to handle only the dis-
tribution of electric power and relieve itself of the in-
creasing costs of generation. Over a period of years the 
city will acquire an interest in the generating and trans-
mission system of the Federation by paying into the 
Federation money for its power. Appellants appear to 
be greatly alanned that the City would in this way ac-
quire an interest in generating facilities which may be 
scattered and outside Cedar City. If the City could go 
outside the city limits to buy or build generating facili-
ties, there should be no harm in acquiring an interest in 
those of the Federation with the money being spent for 
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power. In other words, the City would be getting double 
value for its money spent for power. This would appear 
to be only good business and a matter for Cedar City to 
legislatively determine instead of a legal problem for 
decision. 
Appellants rely upon the case of City of Phoenix v. 
Michael, Arizona, 148 Pac. (2d) 353 as authority for 
support of their argument that the action of the City 
in respect to purchasing an interest in a generating 
facility outside the corporate limits in connection with 
the Federation is beyond the City's authority. That case 
had to do with the expenditure by the City of Phoenix 
from its public funds of a sum of money to a League of 
cities in Arizona organized for the purpose of training 
municipal officers ani also for lobbying in the State 
Legislature. It was held that the City had no business 
spending its money to do these two things and which 
holding would appear only reasonable and therefore the 
expenditure was illegal. But that case did not involve 
the expenditure of only special funds for a power system 
which cities in Utah may legally buy and own. 
Appellants also seem to feel that Sections 15-7-6 and 
15-8-20 U. C. A. 1943 which deal with a city's power to 
contract for lighting of its city streets and public build-
ings and places is controlling upon the question of sign-
ing a contract with the Federation to supply the city 
with power for 35 years. Those two sections limit the 
length of a contract of street lighting and lighti'ng for 
public buildings to three years, but surely appellants 
do not seriously contend that these sections are i.n any 
way applicable. It is clear that they only apply to con-
tracts for public lighting and they have nothing to do 
with contracts for the purchase of power or fra·nchises, 
for that matter. Utah has no statutory or constitutional 
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restriction or limitation upon the length of time a city 
may grant a franchise or contract for services such as 
contemplated in this case. This is confirmed by the case 
of Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co. 93 Pac. 828. If 
the cities of Utah were limited to three years in the 
franchises they give or contracts for the purpose of 
power or water, then practically every such fra·nchise 
held by any company with a city in Utah is likewise 
invalid as it is probably common knowledge that they 
normally run many times three years. 
III 
CEDAR CITY HAS NOT DELEGATED TO ANY-
ONE ITS RATE MAKING POWER OR THE POWER 
TO DETERMINE THE TYPE AND COST OF A 
MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEM. 
At the outset it is admitted that the power to make 
rates for electric service or for that matter any utility 
which a city may legally own is a power which cannot 
be delegated by the City. Appellants contend that by 
being a member of the Federation and agreeing to buy 
power from the Federation at a wholesale rate subject 
to change so as to only reflect the cost at all times, is 
in effect a delegation of rate making power. Merely 
because the Federation would set the wholesate rate, 
which of course would go to the ultimate retail rate in 
Cedar City would not be delegating to the Federation 
the power to fix rates, however. If such were the case, 
every city which buys power or anythi'ng else for resale 
in the community by the City would be allowing the 
seller of the electricity or other commodity to determine 
rates. Of course the price a wholesaler charges a retailer 
i'ndirectly determines what the retailer will sell the com-
modity for. This is an inescapable fact of our economic 
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system. As previously stated, many cities in Utah own 
their distribution system and purchase their power from 
some private company.· The rate is set by contract and 
of course that rate determines to a degree what the City 
will sell it for. But this has never been considered as 
granting to the power company the right to fix rates. The 
city would stili fix that rate at any level it could other-
wise legally do, considering all costs of operation. 
Any city which owns a municipal power system and 
generates its power has to buy diesel fuel or coal, unless 
a hydro-electric system is in use, and the price paid for 
the fuel oil or coal to a • certain extent determines the 
price of electricity. It. would seem that additional argu-
ment is not needed to show that there is no delegation 
of rate making power by Cedar City in this case but 
attention should be called to two Utah cases which have 
ruled on this point, Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co. 
supra and Lehi City v. Meiling, supra.. 
Appellants have cited the Brummitt case to support 
their argument that there has been a delegation of power 
and that such is unlawful. This is indeed odd, because 
the ruling of the Brummitt case definitely establishes 
that there is no delegation of power in the case at bar 
about which the appellants can complai'n. There it was 
claimed there was an unlawful delegation of water rate 
making power. The court held that the City of Ogden 
had tried to illegally delegate its power to fix rates but 
held further that since this was unlawful, the company 
to which the delegation was attempted got nothing and 
the City lost nothing and therefore the plaintiff had suf-
fered no loss about which it could complai'n. Likwise, 
if there is any attempted delegation of power in any of 
the particulars set out in appellant's brief, such is not 
legal admittedly but likewise the appellants have no 
cause to complain. 
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In the Meiling case it was likewise contended that 
the Metropolitan Water District Act of 1935 allowed a 
city to delegate to the water district power over city 
finances and property and to interfere with city affairs, 
but the court held that such was not the case and stated: 
"Nor does the act provide for interference with 
any municipal improvement, money, property or 
effects. The power of control vested in the Board of 
Directors is over the property, improvements, money 
and effects of the district and not that of any of the 
cities and towns whose territorial boundaries may 
be coincidental with that of the district or included 
therein." 
As an answer to the charge that the City has dele-
gated to the Federation the right to compel the city to 
levy taxes in order to defray its expenses in the operation 
or to pay off the R.E.A. loan, we only need to look at 
Ordinance 100 which was adopted by Cedar City and the 
voters of the city which definitely limits any expe·nditure 
which the City could conceivably make to the gross 
revenues received from the operation of the utility. Un-
less the ordinance is valid so as to enable the City to 
raise its portion of the purchase price, then the proposed 
transaction could not be consummated because the City 
would have no money, and if it is valid, and it is not 
under attack, it becomes an integral part of the entire 
transaction. To repeat, the only money Cedar City could 
spend is revenue from the operation of the power system 
and the ordinance expressly binds the City and this can 
be relied upon by the appellants and every other resident 
of Cedar City as a protection to them against the evils 
which appellants say will result. 
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IV 
THE APPELLANTS CAN IN NO WAY BE AD-
VERSELY AFFECTED BY THE CONSUMMATION 
OF THE PROPOSED PLAN AND THEREFORE 
HAVE NO CAUSE TO COMPLAIN. 
As pointed out in this brief, the funds here involved 
are special funds and not general or public funds, the 
expenditure of which is stringently regulated by our 
statutes and constitution. None of the prohibitions relat-
ing to the incurring of debts, advertising for bids for con-
struction or pledging the credit of the city to pay off 
obligations of others have any application to this case. 
The appellants cannot and have not shown wherein the 
consummation of the plan will take away any city funds, 
deprive the city of its ability to perform its functions 
or raise taxes in any way. They cannot show where it 
will affect any person in Cedar City adversely from a 
financial standpoint. For this reason most if not all of 
the objections raised by appellants are disposed of. The 
City contends that all elements of this over~all plan are 
legal and within the power of the City but in any event, 
because of the expenditure of special funds only, they 
would have no cause to complain. 
It seems that the appellants' main concern here is 
not necessarily with the legality or illegality of the acts 
of the City, but rather with the particular method 
adopted by the City to achieve the result. The appellants 
are objecting to the length of time granted in the whole-
sale power contract-35 years; they are objecting to the 
fact that Cedar City, for 35 years is giving up its right 
to generate its own power. They are objecting to the fact 
that the City has tied itself to buy power from the Fed-
eration which serves rural areas when Cedar City might 
be able to take care of its own needs at a cheaper rate. 
They object to the fact that Cedar City will be a minority 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
owner in the Federation and in many other particulars. 
It is submitted by the City that the different acts and 
contracts of the City are legal and are only the method 
chosen to acquire and operate its own power system. The 
City has decided that the method adopted was the best 
one in the long run. It has therefore exercised its discre-
tion in a legislative capacity and this Court is not con-
cerned with the wisdom or folly of the plan. As pointed 
out in the case of Brummitt v. Ogden Water Works Co., 
supra and also by Mr. Justice Elias Hansen in the case of 
Utah Power and Light Co. vs. Provo City, supra, these are 
legislative, discretionary matters with which the court is 
not concerned. It may appear that the City could have 
driven a harder bargain or that the agreements appear 
to favor the Federation, but this is not enough to make 
them illegal. On all these matters, the appellants cannot 
be heard to complain. 
Attention should be called to the Brummitt case 
and the Lehi City v. Meiling case where the court held 
among other things that the plaintiffs could not be ad-
versely affected by the consummation of the scheme pro-
posed. The Court, in the Meiling case observed that the 
cities involved had not been called upon to do any of 
the things it was claimed were illegal and beyond the 
cities' power and stated that if, at some future date any 
city was called upon to lend its credit or obligate itself 
for any unknown obligation that such may be illegal and 
if any plaintiff was to be aggrieved by the action, he 
could then enjoin the City. The question is, can the 
plaintiffs and appellants, i'n advance, champion the rights 
of others as was refused in the Brummitt case, when 
they have suffered no loss? As in the Meiling case, Cedar 
City has not been asked to do any of the things appel-
lants claim can be asked and which are illegal. The 
proposed plan is as yet only on paper and has not been 
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consummated. If at any future date, Cedar City might 
be required to perform in any of the particulars which 
appellants claim are illegal then the appellants could 
seek to enjoin the City. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The appellants have the burden of pointing out 
wherein the power plan contemplated by the City, or 
some rna terial part, is illegal and beyond the powers 
of the City and not merely the exercise of the legislative 
discretion of the City. 
The major objective of the City is to acquire and 
operate the electrical distribution system of Southern 
Utah Power Company within the corporate limits of the 
City. In order to buy this portion of the company, whose 
parents Company is in Bankruptcy, it has become neces-
sary to purchase shares of common stock so as to parti-
cipate in the dissolution of the company and the acquisi-
tion of the property it wants. Surely this is not such a 
purchase of corporate stock as to be unconstitutional. 
After the acquisition of the distribution system, the 
City, instead of generating its power, which the appel-
lants seems to feel it should do, intends to purchase all 
of it from the Federation, a non-profit corporation of the 
State of Utah and made up of other southern Utah users. 
This company can make no profit but exists only for its 
members. The appellants claim that by so becoming a 
member, the City is allowing the Federation to make 
assessments on the City for the payment of the loan of 
the Federation. But the Federation has contracted, by 
a special contract, with the City which governs any 
payments to be made by the City and it is submitted 
that this contract, not the Articles of Incorporation of 
the Federation, which provide for alternate methods of 
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paying for electricity, determines what the City will pay. 
Admittedly the sums paid to the Federation for electri-
city will be used to pay off the indebtedness of the Fed-
eration incurred to purchase its properties but if this 
is such a lending of credit to the Federation as to come 
within our constitutional prohibition herein relied upon, 
then it would be difficult indeed for any city to operate 
and not violate it. 
Further, all of the money to be spent by the City 
will come from a special fund having nothing to do with 
the city's credit, finances or solvency or tax structure. 
The ordinance adopted by the City in of itself answers 
most if not all of the questions raised by appellants as 
all of them are either financial restrictions directly or 
have their roots in the protection and safeguard of the 
City's credit and indirectly the taxpayer. But if we are 
not concerned with finances, credit of the city, or public 
funds as intended by these constitutional and statutory 
restrictions, then they most certainly are not applicable. 
The appellants have not shown and ca-nnot show where 
they will be adversely affected in any way by the con-
summation of the plan proposed because none of the 
funds to be spent will affect them. 
Lastly, the plan proposed has never been put into 
operation. If at any future time, the Federation attempts 
to claim the right to in any way force the City to lend its 
credit, any citizen of Cedar City could then enjoin it. If 
the City has attempted to lend its credit, which the 
Respondents deny, then such is illegal and the City 
could not be forced to perform and therefore, we have a 
situation where the City or its citizens have given up 
nothing and the Federation has gained nothing. 
The appellants must go further than merely point 
out remote possibilities. This is a large transaction in-
volving a considerable area and a great number of 
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people. It has been necessary to enter into a number of 
contracts and associations in order to achieve the desired 
result. If any parts of the plan appear to be unfavorable 
to the City, they are of no concern to this Court if within 
the power of the City or if the appellants will not be 
adversely affected thereby. All of these parts to this 
plan must be considered together as all are part of the 
integrated plan and when the over-all picture is seen 
and not merely isolated parts, its legality should not be 
open to question. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORVILLE ISOM and 
LEROY H. COX, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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